Is there an answer to Syria's problems?

 

As the UN Security Council struggle to see eye to eye, are there any possibilities for resolving Syria?

As the Libyan freedom fighters and the National Transitional Council prepare for life post-Gaddafi rule, it is time to reflect upon the issue of intervention. Almost six months on since the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was put into practice, we finally see Gaddafi on the run and with him the suppression allowing for a future of hope. As things begin to smooth out political eyes of the West stretch their gaze towards Syria and the ongoing demonstrations for democracy. There are many calls for intervention in Syria however will the chance for further intervention ever occur and who is capable of leading such an effort?

Currently a European backed resolution drafted by the French has been put to the UN Security Council which as French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe suggested on Friday September 2^nd that is “our objective to obtain a resolution at the Security Council condemning the use of violence against civilians and organising a regime of sanctions”. However, of the 15 members of the council, it is likely that Russia and China will use their vetos against the resolution despite it not calling for military action as the believe the UNSC needs to encourage negotiations instead of aligning to either side;

“We are proposing that the UN Security Council firmly demands that all parties to the conflict respect human rights and begin talks,” said the Foreign Minister for Russia, Sergei Lavrov.

“If it’s up to the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the Libyan scenario won’t be repeated”.

The rejection and blocking of resolutions against Syria by Russia and China could be interpreted as either a backlash against the milking of the resolution on Libya “to protect all civilians” which turned into a bombing campaign against any pro-Gaddafi threat, or simply the Russians and Chinese taking a tougher stance on their non-intervention style foreign policy.

Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, has urged all deciding countries to impose more sanctions on the government of Syria, saying that more demands were needed to force him to step down.  Due to the recent respective failures of economic sanctions, it does appear that these sanctions will only force the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to become yet more defiant and that perhaps the backers of the resolution are only taking the necessary steps needed before intervention merely hoping that he will step down at the whim of international economic suppression.

However as Western powers shy away from military intervention it appears that economic sanctions may be the best option, this being the case if particular attention is paid to Syria’s money-spinning oil and gas industries. It is important that if economic sanctions are to work that there is a clear path ahead for when and how these sanctions will be lifted. If the incentive can encourage political transition even at least to a multi-party system and election overviewed by an international organization, then Turkey will be a key economic partner for Syria’s future. Turkey have the goal of being a key Middle-Eastern player in mind and will try to act within the interests of the region whilst also holding the hand of the West. A tricky game of relationships for Turkey to handle but if successful will give themselves and the Middle-East new realms of respect and opportunity.

The new Special Relationship

Sino-African relations have a big part to play in global security, understanding the Chinese perspective is imperitive.
Earlier this year China expectedly passed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. It is largely expected that the rising power in the East will surpass the United States within the next 15 years to become the world’s largest economy. This raises two types of questions, what are the effects? The main problem China faces is the changing shape of its economy of one being manufacturing to one of consumerism. With unprecedented growth in GDP since 1977 comes the increasing of purchasing power within its members of society as the middle class begins to bulge. It is widely commentated that those members that are becoming middle class are also beginning to consume vast quantities of meat which they wouldn’t have done before. The grain that used to feed themselves is now being fed to the animals that provide the meat, however this isn’t enough. And of course with an increase in consumerism comes an increasing in consumption of energy for such material items that come accustomed with middle income living.

Its relationship with Africa has become of increasing interest as it increasingly expands the long reaching arm of China with what can effectively be described as ‘land grab’ within the underdeveloped, resource rich continent. China’s increasing involvement with the continent is a sign of its economic and political intentions as Wen Jiabao noted in July of 2004 that “China and Namibia have conducted very good economic cooperation over the years, which is based on reciprocity and mutual benefit and has brought benefits to the two peoples”. Many realists would believe that their relationship with the developing countries is to gain alignment and support as it positions itself in the ever changing world order. However, continuing rhetoric would imply that China is simply acquiring the needs to continue the development of its economy and security. In coalition to this apparent strategy China entertains a non-interventionist foreign policy which allows it to keep a form of neutrality across contentious issues such as their abstention from the Libyan Resolution vote. Previously Liu Guijin, the Chinese government’s special representative to Africa, said in 2006 that “China has no intention to undermine Africa’s democracy. China is working hard to build a socialist democracy at home and promote human rights and good governance”.

As much as can be said for China’s non-intervention style foreign policy, accusations of its poor management in the Dafur situation in the last decade did question their legitimacy for economic involvement. Sino-Sudan relations are only apparent because of the U.S.’s decision to pull out of Khartoum when there was instability in the region and thus in accordance with their development policy it became untenable on the face of it. However this paved the way for a leading Chinese petroleum company to invest here. And thus Chinese involvement was blamed for violence in Sudan as claims from Save Darfur were made that China was the lead supplier of weapons in the region whereas in actual fact China only accounted for 8% arms sales and Russia accounted for almost 11 times that amount. This is a common example of China “bashing” from the West as it struggles to come to terms with a competitive power. Such organisations such as Save Darfur do have legitimate grounds to question China’s continued involvement in volatile areas however misuse of information can only create more anti-China speculation on a world stage where tolerance and understanding is paramount in future stability.

CHALLENGER TO THE WEST: CHINA’S GEOPOLITICAL STANDING.

ABSTRACT
China has been reaching its international development arm out towards the continent of Africa in search of strategic partnerships. Its desire to become a major player internationally requires support in global institutions and of course with its poor record on human rights and its communist past, there are many reluctant partners that have a fair swing internationally. China thus much look towards African countries in support, and as is well known Africa is a largely untapped resource full of potential to support China’s development and its own potential to become a large international player. These strategical changes challenge the current position of the global hegemony. This article will address how China views development aid and why it has developed strong geopolitical partnerships. China is seen as a rogue creditor by the West but failure to address the powerfulness of China’s aid will result in a greater lack of understand of how China goes about its geopolitical business.

‘In 1982 the 12th CPC National Assembly established principles for a new type of interstate political relationship based on “Independence, Complete Equality, Mutual Respect (and) Non-Interference in Others’ Internal Affairs”’ (Anshan 2007).

Introduction: Defining geopolitics and China’s comprehension of development.
China’s relationship with Africa has become of great interest to academics, politicians and development institutions as we try to pin down the geopolitics of China’s African development. As the great Eastern power races ahead of Japan as the second largest economy (Economist 2010) in the world it is clear that it has needed to expand its reach across the globe. China’s economic growth has in turn required an expansive bi-national and multilateral foreign policy especially towards those countries which will secure the future of the industrialising giant (Power, Mohan 2005: 1). The West’s diplomatic, political and economic hegemony is under an increasingly visible challenge from China as Sino-African relations indicate an altering in the world order (Mawdsley 2007: 416). To the naked eye it may appear that China’s vested interests in Africa are resource related only however as the Centre for Chinese Studies (University of Stellenbosch) states it is ‘driven by a number of political, economic and arguably social drivers’ (Davies 2008: 4). Overseas development assistance and aid are prepared to meet these objectives strategically. It is of course important to understand what China means by these terms, as it states here; ‘grants or loans that are extended to developing countries... are undertaken by government or government bodies, with the promotion of economic development and welfare as their main objectives, at concessional financial times’, an explanation from the OECD’DAC of ODA which China enjoy a parallel with over this said definition. China has a great influence in African development, and its geopolitical nature will be explored in this article.

Firstly we need to briefly understand geo-politics in a developmental sense. Power (2010) suggests it is ‘impossible to understand the contemporary making of Development theory and practice without reference to geo-politics and the geopolitical imagination of non-Western societies’. The term geo-politics is actually quite hard to pin-down and define itself, but a good attempt is by Power (2003) himself who suggests the term is largely to do with how important location and positional politics are in international relations. The West quite probably has problems with understanding Africa because of its neorealist assertion on positioning the state at the centre of explanations (Dunn 2001). Normalisation of the European state as a benchmark for analysis creates problems as it does not respect the individual aspects and sovereignty of African states. China has politically aligned itself with Africa and constantly positions itself away from the West’s developmental assistance policy towards Africa which has usually been conditional placing political stability or democratisation at its foremost principle. This then paves the way for China which can focus on countries where the U.S. bilateral relationship is stumbling (Kurlantzick 2007) allowing it to develop a relationship based around mutual understanding.

Where is China going: developing its venture in African Development.
History shows us the path of change that the CPC has had in its policy towards Africa. Its development assistance was quite clearly purely political as it attempted to capture other Non-Aligned states in an ideological battle and was in a sort “exporting revolution” during the 1960’s after it’s ideological split from the other communist power, the Soviet Union (Anshan 2007: 71). However for a while Sino-African relations did struggle as throughout the Maoist period (Harding, 1994: 394). This exporting revolution stopped at the end of the 1960’s and aid started to become “free and unconditional” (Ogunsanwo 1974: 185-220). As Mawdsley (2007: 410) writes Taylor suggests that Deng Xiaoping modernized foreign policy so that it was more about non-conflictual styles and economic investment. Of course this kind of attitude began to strengthen links with other countries. Muekalia (2004) summarizes Sino-African relations well when we writes:

China had gradually changed its tactics from confrontation to co-operation, from revolution to economic development, and from isolation to international engagement (Meukalia 2004: 7)

China developed a strong feeling and understanding on its position when it came to development assistance. Theoretically they want to position themselves ideologically away from the West, liberal perspectives and offer an alternative option for African countries in partnering their development assistance. The Chinese Premiership felt that improving Africa’s opportunities to self-develop enhanced their usefulness geopolitically. The CPC, as Anshan (2007) states, developed the idea of a ‘spirit of co development’ in which free aid became aid that was mutually beneficial. The idea of non-interference is extraordinarily important in focusing its goals across the world. This concept of noninterference maintains that human rights shouldn’t be a reason to interfere in another’s internal affairs (People Daily 2006). Keeping this principle close to Chinese foreign policy of development aid it can ensure its own sovereignty whilst gaining the trust of African nations, which the latter in turn results in support in the UN which it so desperately needs. This geopolitical concept of noninterference that China has is a result of its position as it has aligned itself alongside the AU and its members. It respects sovereignty because it tells of its anti-colonial struggle with other major powers, thus understanding the position that post-colonial states face (Mawdsley 2007). It can be said that China may be doing what Gramsci describes as a “war of position”, when a counter hegemony establishes itself within the existing one with the premise of replacing it or altering it (Cox 1996).

In 2006 the Chinese Premier Wen Jibao declared that China too was a “victim of colonial aggression”. He also argues that China and Africa are cradles of civilization saying also that they both ‘belong to the developing world’ and face similar enemies whilst having common strategic interests, thus sharing a perspective on major international issues. There most important perspective in this case is about development policy finding that the West’s experiences of achieving development are far from any African experience and in reality can offer few transferrable lessons (Power, Mohan 2008: 10-11). This opens a loop hole for China to capture nations that wont “play ball” with the West’s ideas of development. Liu Guijin, the Chinese government’s special representative to Africa, said in 2006 that “China has no intention to undermine Africa’s democracy. China is working hard to build a socialist democracy at home and promote human rights and good governance” (Power, Mohan 2005: 17). This is consistent with what Anshan (2007) suggests about China’s geopolitical nature in Africa when she suggests that China itself does not feel reasonably acquitted to pass judgment on the domestic affairs of African countries, believing that the AU was created for a reason.

China’s geopolitical nature is to, as mentioned earlier, position itself away from the hegemonic Western view of development policy and theory. It created its own China-Africa Development Fund thus gesturing further its intentions of playing a large role in African development and showing its reluctance to work within the existing international frameworks by creating its own vehicle for assistance (Davies 2007: 28). This also shows its preference in bilateral relationships when it’s dealing with development foreign policy as dialogue becomes clear and simple between the two actors. During 2006 there was international debate over China’s involvement in Darfur, Sudan. The situation was of course manifested in complications, however China and Africa both shared the view that different countries are always in different stages of development and it would unfair and ineffective to judge another country by differing standards where they may not be applicable (Anshan 2007: 76). China at the time believed that the situation in Darfur was one related with a lack of or poor development and not the government thus suggesting that sanctions ‘would only bring more trouble to the region’ (Anshan 2007: 77). This actually fell in line with a UNEP report that clearly stated: “Environmental degradation, as well as regional climate instability and change, are major underlying causes of food insecurity”, violence and conflict in Darfur (UNEP 2007). Sino-Sudan relations are only apparent because of the U.S.’s decision to pull out of Khartoum when there was instability in the region and thus in accordance with their development policy it became untenable on the face of it. However this paved the way for a leading Chinese petroleum company to invest here. And thus Chinese involvement was blamed for violence in Sudan as claims from Save Darfur were made that China was the lead supplier of weapons in the region (Save Darfur 2007), whereas McGregor (2009) clearly states that China only accounted for 8% arms sales and Russia accounted for almost 11 times that amount. This is a common example of China “bashing” from the West as it struggles to come to terms with a competitive power in the development sphere. One problem that we do face however as studiers of China’s developmental aid, is that information about governmental international aid is kept very much a state secret. This secrecy is justified to avoid domestic criticism of providing aid to other countries when poverty needs to be eradicated in China itself, and also to avoid criticism from other major donor countries (Lancaster 2007). China has clearly troubled the dominant aid regime but other donors cannot afford to be overly critical as they fear upsetting the great eastern power. In line with Millennium Development Goal 8, building a global partnership for development, agencies like DFID call for dialogue and co-operation with China to build this “global partnership”(UN).

Conclusion: What does China do in the future?
China’s dominant principle of non-interference is something that it is quite hard to see liberal Western countries and institutions getting on board with. But it does seem that China’s preference of geopolitical multilateral aid is something that these institutions can tempt China with. The developmental assistance that China geopolitically places is to support their rise to power. It is quite clear that they are a power that wants to contest hegemony and become a major pole in a multipolar world (Power, Mohan 2008). China’s rise has been peaceful and with its win-win diplomacy it becomes ever more consistent with multilateralism rather than multipolarity (Shimbun 2008).
China’s love of bilateral relationships within Africa is a fundamental feature for their development assistance as ‘African votes have been crucial in blocking resolutions’ (Power, Mohan 2008) in the UN regarding domestic human rights. This is a classic example of the success of China’s non-interference, co-dependency and respect of sovereignty that has clearly encouraged win-win diplomacy. Whether these kind of multi-bilateral relationships will be sustainable remains to be seen, however what is sure is that if the West wish to keep in competition with China it will need to change its principles on development assistance or create a mutual partnership with the rising China.






Abbreviated Terms

AU - African Union.
CPC - Communist Party of China.
DFID - Department for International Development
OECD-DAC - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee.
ODA - Overseas Development Assistance.
UN - United Nations.
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme







BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Anshan, L (2007). ‘China and Africa: Policy and Challenges’. China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007 World Security Institute.
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13. Ogunsanwo, A (1974). ‘China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71’. London: Cambridge UP.
14. Muekalia, D (2004). ‘Africa and China’s strategic partnership’. African Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 1
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19. "United Nations Millennium Development Goals." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. Web. 25 Apr. 2011. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml
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http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200803170057.html/.

HAVE THE PRIORITIES OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY CHANGED SINCE 1956?

When analysing foreign policy there are many angles and models that one can use to interpret the actions of the state or government of the time. There are models that can identify behaviour due to institutional practices, decisions due to global multilateral organisations (therefore out of the government’s control) and those that look at decision making done by the few and or individuals. I would like to look at how foreign policy decisions are made from the individual’s point of view or an interpretive actor perspective. In this sense it is most important to understand the decisions from the situation the decision-makers are in by ‘reconstructing their reasons’ . In this model the foreign policy of states depends on ‘how individuals with power perceive and analyse situations’ thus making it important to have direct interpretations from the foreign policy actors such as, in Britain’s case; the Prime Minister (PM), their advisors, members of the foreign office, ambassadors and in some cases and not so much in others, the cabinet. I do however understand there are other models which may explain decisions and come out with similar if not the same outcomes, however I believe this can be one of the most comprehensive ways of really analysing the reasons behind the decisions. In terms of analysing the priorities of British foreign policy I believe that under this case the priorities will be apparent from what the Prime Minister, their close advisors and ministers perceive them to be from their individual and collective standings. The few examples that I will be able to use to enunciate the changes in priorities of British foreign policy, if there have been, will be governance under Prime Ministers Eden, Thatcher and Blair.

There have been many important events in foreign policy in Great Britain since 1956; some economically worldwide, some geographically closer such as integration into the EU, however I will look to focus on the military, or defence, events and situations since 1956 and how Great Britain changed and evolved as a global power and why this happened, and who was behind this re-shaping of the priorities of foreign policy around Britain. I will recognise important economic events but not look into the decisions behind them, but I may engage in how they may have impacted on certain defence and military issues. Before analysing the foreign policy since 1956 it is important to set a little context as a guide. Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century was the global power. If straight away we move forward to the Second World War it was clear that Britain could not ‘stand alone’ as a power anymore with the threat of military invasion from Nazi Germany. Thus it needed to rely on its bilateral and multilateral relationships with the US and its commonwealth partners to protect its own security militarily and economically. Before this time Britain had been used to being a very strong economic and military power stretching far beyond its territorial boundaries .

During 1956 when the Conservatives were in power with Eden at the helm as Prime Minister, an international situation arose when President Nasser of Egypt announced the ‘nationalisation of the (Suez) canal’ in a speech on July 26th in Alexandria, which to the British appeared to be an irrational move. Before then the Suez Canal was owned by, and a prize asset of the then struggling, British Empire and it held important economic and middle-eastern strategic value. The handling of this situation was pivotal in the shaping of Britain as a post colonial world power. Prime Minister of the time, Eden was best known as a man ‘innocent of economic understanding’ and instead having ‘unrivalled expertise in foreign affairs’ . This would rationally place him as someone who would be able to deal with the Suez Canal Crisis in a realistic manner, however this was a man regarded as old-fashioned and unwilling to let go of Britain’s reduced power in the world. He wanted to accentuate Britain’s position and this was a priority of his. This shows from an interpretive actor approach that his personal situation and context provides explanations of the future decisions he makes in the aggressive assertiveness towards an old colonial power.
During the build up to the military action that Eden’s government took against President Nasser, there was a series of communications between Eden and President Eisenhower. This was so Eden could have powerful political backing in being able to take action to the sort that his government wanted to dictate. Eden perceived Nasser to be a threat to the West and thus felt it necessary to remove him as he states in his letter to Eisenhower dated 5th August 1956: ‘The removal of Nasser, and the installation in Egypt of a regime less hostile to the West, must therefore also rank high among our objectives’ . At this point in time you can see that Eden is desperate to involve other reasons or excuses so that the Americans will involve their political and militaristic power in the priority for Britain to show their “might”. Is the aggressive British response an attempt to show their priorities to be re-enforced military capabilities or was there an economic back grounding?
In the excerpts from the British Cabinet Minutes (28th August 1956), Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time suggested that the Suez Crisis was a ‘major risk to the national economy’ and a ‘threat to our oil supplies’ . This clearly shows another rational reason for aggressive action against Egypt. This was something put to and agreed by the cabinet that it was to be seen as a major issue. These minutes show that the priorities and actions of the government were not determined by a “Presidential-Prime Minister” but by a collective pattern of thought in bringing together individualistic approaches, thus being explained through an interpretive actor approach.

As we know Britain came out of the Suez Canal Crisis without the result their government was so desperate to prove and achieve. Britain’s image was tainted by this embarrassing loss in the Arab region. The priorities needed to be changed as Britain needed to recognise its own potential power globally and this change would need to come from the people within the governing body, this being how an interpretive actor model would recognise it. Britain in this time had to deal with it being a country having two difficult sets of foreign policy issues: firstly its downfall in the international ladder of states and the second related with the need to adapt to an ever more interdependent international system . The achievement of dealing with these goals within the sixties and seventies was a large success in re-balancing British foreign policy.

Now if we move into the eighties there is another Conservative government and with the first female Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. As is commonly recognised she was known as the “Iron Lady” for her tough style of government in parliament and in her own cabinet. With this in mind it is important to evaluate her priorities within foreign policy during her time in governance as this was key to her decision making process. An important time during the Thatcher years was the Falklands War in 1982. The year before this event the Defence Secretary, John Nott, ignored the advice of the 1981 Strategic Defence Review which suggested that ‘removing the token defence of the island might encourage Argentinian aggression’ . At the time Prime Minister Thatcher was making deep cuts and wanted to reduce defence spending by ‘removing HMS Endurance from service on the Falklands’ . This shows that even though expert advice from bureaucracies such as Whitehall is important it can still be ignored by the individual decision makers such as in this case the Defence Secretary and the PM thus meaning it important to reflect on an interpretive actor approach. In this case the Defence Secretary was too worried about providing the “necessary” cuts for his Prime Minister resulting in an irrational decision in the area of foreign policy but rational as an individual actor thus showing the importance of individuals behaviour in foreign policy analysis. The Argentines showing increasing hostilities through their military leadership proceeded to invade the Falklands on 2nd April 1982. Britain’s image was that it had become weak socially and economically which surely gives an explanation in the Argentines actions as they would not have thought it worth attempting attacking the islands . Thatcher says in her memoirs ‘we were defending our honour as a nation’ and that she ‘never thought that (I) would have to order British troops into combat’ . This shows continuity in a priority of keeping Britain’s reputation high. The priority for Thatcher not being war itself but the reconciliation of Britain and it to be respected which in turn shows continuities with the Conservative government of 16 years previous.

In this particular incident the Foreign Offices concerns presented to Thatcher on the 2nd April were received as ‘negative considerations’ . The Prime Minister here implies that the bureaucracy of the Foreign Office is inflexible in its ‘principle characteristics’ and there was a need for a more executive approach in this particular area of foreign policy. Thatcher contradictory to Eden believed in the need for a strong leader to guide the government and country through a tough predicament. When she came to power without any foreign policy experience the Falklands change her perception of how involved she would need to be in this area. She was aggressive in nature and negotiation and did manage to win minor battles effectively in European matters but, as some writers say, she did little to secure viable long term prospects within Europe . However this is due the difficulties in being able to pursue more than one or two major issues convincingly thus making the priorities extremely important. Her aggressive style or nipping them in the bud shows the importance of analysing her priorities as she was the chief decision maker in the foreign office.

The next area of analysis comes to the New Labour governance of Tony Blair from 1997. Now Blair was quite different in re-directing the priorities in British foreign policy. Blair was the “Presidential Prime Minister” that has been earlier mentioned and this is clear as he often held bilateral meetings where he did the “business end” of politics and left the Cabinet as more of a debating room than a decision-maker . One of Blair’s priorities was for Britain to form an ‘ethical state’ identity by using its large capabilities as a soft power (the idea of soft power includes such things as using the extensive diplomatic network, full membership of international institutions etc). This is a broad change from the 1956 priority which was to restore Britain as a global power. Blair used this political spin to adjust Britain’s directions as a force for good. This ethical policy was founded through Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and subsequently died with him when he left office over the Iraq War affair . Blair very much believed in the powerful countries of the world to realise their responsibilities in other countries affairs when there were humanitarian issues , which of course explains his interventions in the foreign affairs towards Kosovo (pressuring US support from Clinton), Afghanistan and Iraq. His direction of foreign priorities was also directed in becoming the most supportive ally of the United States as is shown through his statement of support to President Bush in 2002. Blair had support across the board from his foreign policy decision makers which was not necessarily the foreign secretary but his personal advisors and the British Ambassador, Christopher Meyer as he states here ‘I was a firm supporter of calling Saddam Hussein to account, if necessary by war’ . His interpretation of how Britain should be seen was a personal preference over any advice given him by the foreign office, which again identifies why it is so important to analyse his individual approach and feelings given the style of leadership he engaged in.

It is clear that the priorities of a post colonial government were to prove its international status. Especially post Suez when the failed to do so, it was important for a rebalancing of foreign policy in between then and Thatcher. Thatcher stabilised foreign policy but also paved the way for a more Presidential style of government and through this tried to restore a place for Britain in the international order. Blair could see that the Britain lacked the ability to act on an international stage without the support of the ever increasing liberal institutions or a major superpower, such as America. He believed that Britain had the ability and a duty to act as an ethical state and support change through whatever means when humanitarian aid was necessary. This shows that there has been a significant change in the priorities of British Foreign Policy.

It is largely the behaviour of other ministers, including the Prime Minister, and advisors that determine foreign policy, not the foreign secretary. It appears that they play more of a representative role and cover the issues the PM does not. To me it can be seen that there are other important actors in foreign policy as the factors impacting on foreign policy are multi-layered. However I believe the top, most important layer and to be the individual decision makers such as the PM as an individual not just a leader which in turn explains the importance of the Interpretive Actor perspective when approaching the study of foreign policy.







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